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Susan Dynarski and Daniel Kreisman presented a paper that proposes a new system of 
federal student lending based on an income-based model of repayment in which pay-
ments will automatically rise and fall with a borrower’s earnings, just as contributions 
to Social Security do. The paper was commissioned by The Hamilton Project, and while 
this volume provides only a synopsis of it, the full version can be accessed at The Ham-
ilton Project’s Web site, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/fi les/downloads_and_links/
THP_DynarskiDiscPaper_Final.pdf.
Borrowing for college has risen steadily for decades, and student-
loan debt has mounted to $1 trillion, now surpassing credit cards as the 
third-largest form of consumer debt. With 7 million student loans in 
default and rising tuition prices, some are beginning to wonder if the 
costs associated with student borrowing are out of line with the value 
of attending college.
The evidence, however, suggests we have a repayment crisis, not a 
student debt crisis. Four facts support this interpretation. First, typical 
borrowers have only a moderate amount of debt: 69 percent of stu-
dents in recent cohorts borrow $10,000 or less, and 98 percent borrow 
$50,000 or less. Second, the payoff to a college education is high over 
the student’s lifetime. The typical holder of a bachelor’s degree earns 
several hundred thousand dollars more than a high school graduate over 
a lifetime. Even those who start college but do not graduate experience 
lifetime gains of about $100,000. Third, although default rates have 
been rising, they are not driven by the small fraction of borrowers with 
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large loans. Rather, it is borrowers with typical levels of student debt 
who struggle with their payments, especially in the fi rst few years after 
college. Fourth, default is highly correlated with the age of the borrower, 
with younger borrowers at far greater risk of default and delinquency.
Many individuals have diffi culty repaying loans because, under 
the existing system of federal lending, workers typically repay their 
loans early in their careers, when their incomes are relatively low and 
variable. A college education, however, is an investment that pays off 
over many decades. The mismatch between the timing of the costs and 
benefi ts of education is especially salient among young borrowers, 
who are most likely to default. A few missed payments, as penalties 
and fees accrue, can lead to rapidly rising loan balances. The damaged 
credit records that result from a few missed student loan payments can 
block young people from borrowing for other purposes, such as for cars 
and homes. Thus, the current system can turn reasonable levels of debt 
into repayment burdens that make fi nancial independence and stability 
more diffi cult to achieve. Moreover, the current system harms taxpay-
ers because, when delinquency and default rates on loans are high, the 
lender also suffers.
As an alternative, we propose a single, straightforward, income-
based repayment system called Loans for Educational Opportunity 
(LEO). The main idea of this proposal is that the repayment of loans 
would be automatic and simple, and that repayments would increase 
(and decline) with earnings. Employers would deduct contributions 
in the same way that they deduct payroll taxes. For example, the W-4 
would be modifi ed to include a checkbox that asks whether a worker 
has a LEO. Borrowers could also indicate a higher repayment amount 
than the one that would otherwise be automatically deducted by fi l-
ing a W-4 that specifi es additional withholding. Self-employment and 
multiple jobs would be handled the same way as Social Security and 
income taxes, with quarterly payments and an annual reconciliation in 
April to correct any over- or underpayment. Contributions would stop 
when the loan is repaid or after 25 years.
We highlight four key principles:
1) Contribution rates should rise with earnings. Our simulations 
show that setting rates at 3 percent of earnings up to $10,000, 
7 percent between $10,001 and $25,000, and 10 percent above 
$25,001 would result in the typical loan being paid off in 10–15 
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years. A fl at contribution rate of 6–9 percent of earnings would 
achieve similar results but would lead to higher payments (as a 
share of earnings) for many borrowers.
2) Interest rates should hold the taxpayers harmless. The federal 
government should seek neither to make nor to lose money from 
student loans. Student loans correct a capital market failure: the 
private sector will not provide loans that are secured only by a 
borrower’s future earnings. Interest rates should cover the costs 
of borrowing, credit risk from unpaid loans, and administrative 
overhead, and should adjust annually over the life of the loan 
and not be nominally capped.
3) Eliminate in-school interest subsidies. The subsidized Staf-
ford Loan, which is limited to students with suffi cient fi nancial 
need, does not begin to charge interest until the students are out 
of school. This is expensive for the government and has little 
bearing on either college attendance or persistence because 
it does not put any money into the hands of students. Defer-
ring interest accrual while students attend school serves only 
to shorten the repayment period for those who receive it and 
benefi ts borrowers with higher incomes more than those with 
lower incomes.
4) Allow existing borrowers to join the new system. Certain 
borrowers under the old federal loan system will have the 
opportunity to convert their loans to the new system. Only fed-
eral, undergraduate loans can be repaid in this way; loans made 
to parents of students (PLUS Loans) will not be eligible. Exist-
ing borrowers can be brought into the new system by having 
the Department of Education purchase existing loans from the 
private loan companies. There is a precedent for this: during the 
credit crunch, the Department of Education was authorized to 
buy loans from private servicers in order to free up capital so 
that more student loans could be made.
This is a system of loan repayment designed for the vast majority 
of former students—the 98 percent who borrow a manageable amount 
($50,000 or less). For the few students who borrow unmanageable 
amounts, most of whom borrow through the private market, we advo-
cate the following regulatory reforms. First, private loans should be 
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dischargeable in bankruptcy. The protection from bankruptcy, estab-
lished in 2005, gives lenders incentives to make loans even to students 
who are unlikely to be able to handle the payments, since the lender 
knows the borrower cannot ever escape the debt. Second, private lend-
ers should not be allowed to use the label “student loan” for a loan 
that requires a cosigner or credit history. Removing the student loan 
label ensures that borrowers cannot confuse these loans with federal 
student loans and signals to students that they should borrow with cau-
tion. Third, students must exhaust federal lending options before taking 
out private loans. Some students take out private loans without exhaust-
ing their federal loan options, which refl ects a lack of information on 
the part of the borrowers, as Stafford Loans are less costly than private 
loans. 
This proposal can be implemented without adding to the federal 
defi cit; in fact, it will likely save money for the federal government. The 
only major costs that the government would bear are those associated 
with administering repayment of the loans, which is currently handled 
by the private sector. These costs, however, can be more than offset by 
three provisions of this proposal. First, the federal deduction of loan 
interest would be eliminated for federal borrowers paying through the 
new system (which, in time, should be all student borrowers), saving 
$1 billion in tax expenditures. Second, the proposal eliminates existing 
contracts with private loan servicers, which currently cost about $360 
million annually. Finally, as discussed above, the proposal eliminates 
the in-school subsidy, which will reduce by billions the cost of the fed-
eral loan program.
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